This article is a 'shortened' version of what I had written for my History Internal Assessment for the 2010 I.B. Exams.
Along with the several problems that the German Republic had to contend with, there was a revival of a new, open culture. The sudden, abrupt opening of the German culture was not accepted by the public and did not help the Weimar to gain a foothold over Germany. This leads to the question, To what extent was Culture responsible for the fall of Weimar Republic?
The article looks into the factors that resulted in the fall of the Weimar Republic. Though the primary focus on how culture played a role in its fall, it also looks into two other important factors that were instrumental in its early demise: The economic situation and also the Treaty of Versailles, both of which could be linked to the vast disruptions caused after World War 1.
An Analysis of Weimar Republic’s Failure as a Government
In German historical consciousness, the Weimar republic has always been associated with a stigma of failure.[i] Through Weitz’s[ii] analysis of Weimar, the highs and the lows of the government is intricately analyzed up to its fall by the Right. Although the role of the Nazis is not explicitly stated, the Right’s role in the demise of it is not ignored. Though its beginning was troubled and unsettled, the fact that the Germans had created a new political system, forced the Kaiser to abdicate and had great social improvements let the Weimar have a vibrant, active spirit. Though there was an increasing willingness by the Germans to recognize the accomplishments of the Weimar Republic, the general disdain which was felt by many was unmistakable with the popular saying ‘Bonn is not Weimar’.[iii]
The 1920s saw a massive cultural revival in Germany, both in “traditional forms of high culture and in a newly developing mass culture”[iv]. Arguably, the Twenties were the most innovative and it was essentially and predominantly self-defining.[v] Culture, undoubtedly, was the epitome of Weimar’s regime, though it was rebutted by many Germans. Berlin’s prominence during the revival of culture is effectively brought out by Metzger and Brandätter through various pictures of the activities that took place. Simultaneously they provide an in-depth commentary of Berlin’s ‘restless’ cultural boom. The 1920s under Weimar the ‘Roaring’ or ‘Golden’ Twenties. Berlin’s culture of the spectacular was none other than the promise of a mass euphoria that could be enjoyed in the long term.[vi] Harold Nicolson[vii], like Joseph Roth[viii], details the restless nature of Berlin by stating that “there is no other city in the world as restless as Berlin”[ix]. The Youth Movements had modest beginnings at the turn of century and had flourished mightily during the twenties, securing support through the ranks and also among the graduates, many would-be thinkers hunting for an organic philosophy of life. As they had no philosophy, the often allied themselves to the Communists, Socialists or the Nazis and these movements were largely anti-semantic, with only few accepting Jews. The Wandervogel sought warmth and comradeliness, an escape form the lies spawned by the petty bourgeois culture, a clean way of life unmasked by the use of alcohol or tobacco and, above all, a common existence that could rise above self-interest and shabby party politics. [x]
But for those who welcomed the new cultural climate there had been more who had hankered after the past, resented the change and saw cultural experimentation as leading to Germany’s cultural and national degeneration.[xi] The Nazis in particular showed great disgust to the changes happening in Germany and were not particularly fond of the cultural changes. For many, the Weimar cultural explosion reinforced their hostility to the regime.[xii] The NSDAP who were apt in exploiting social resentments of the German middle class, benefitted through the unprecedented rise in vote protest.[xiii] With millions desperate, it was easy for demagogues to offer simple solutions.[xiv] The situation was variously blamed on the Jewish finances, the Versailles Treaty, Weimar Democracy and socials.[xv] The breakthrough of the NSDAP as a mass movement was the decisive event in the last phase of the Weimar Republic. The economic crisis transformed the Nazis into a mass movement[xvi] and enabled them to establish themselves firmly in the political scenario.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that events such as the Treaty of Versailles and the Depression took the toll on the Republic. The economic crisis that perpetually haunted the Weimar affected the relations between the government and the Germans and the society was affected to a large extent. This was largely done by the Treaty of Versailles and the World Depression in 1929. The Treaty of Versailles was the most controversial cause of Germany’s economic condition. The government became unpopular with the signing of the Treaty upon signing and was termed the ‘November Criminals’. The Right exploited this extensively to undermine the democratic rule of Germany. Moreover the Germans felt that the government had not successfully restored Germany’s pride or escaping its association with the hated Versailles.[xvii] The larger economic problems that they faced remained largely “disguised and unsolved” [xviii]. The onslaught of the World Depression, 1929-33, intensified the pressures that brought its final crisis.[xix] Stresemann briefly improved but within Germany but his achievements was condemned by many and was unable to strengthen the system during the years 1924-29.[xx] Gay notes that the Weimar could never “enlist the wholehearted loyalty of all, or even many” as its birth was very severe.[xxi] Others also[xxii], seem to agree on this point, arguing that the Weimar from the beginning never had its true supporters. Layton adds on that due to its narrow support base it was “caught between the extremes of Left and Right”[xxiii]. The little positive signs that the Weimar had, high production to technological advance, came to a crashing halt over the winter of 1929-30.[xxiv]
The reasons for the Weimar Republic's collapse are the subject of continuing debate. It may have been doomed from the beginning since even moderates disliked it and extremists on both the left and right loathed it. Germany had limited democratic traditions and Weimar democracy was widely seen as chaotic. The factors are interlinked and therefore it is impossible to actually pinpoint a single factor for the fall of the Weimar Republic. Culture is one of the factors but its failure to appeal to the mass is interlinked with the economy and the rise of the Nazis. Most Germans felt that the Weimar Regime had unsuccessfully restored Germany’s pride or escape the association with the hated Versailles. [xxv]
The Treaty of Versailles and the Great Depression largely caused the economic instability of Germany, which perpetually weakened them further. Being fragile on all fronts, it was natural that it was vulnerable to the brutal anti- Weimar attacks staged by the Nazis and particularly to the economic situation post-1929. The resentments that were felt among the Germans during the economic stagnation were widely exploited by Nazis and were a crucial factor in establishing them firmly in the Germans’ consciousness. The Nazis became the Right’s ‘most adept purveyors’ and their ideas diffused through them. The Nazi’s rise in popularity and in particular Hitler’s appointment by Hindenburg was fatal; it finalized their take over. Weimar Democracy was really dead before the establishment of Nazi dictatorship in early 1933.[xxvi]
[i] Mommsen, Hans. The Rise & Fall of Weimar Democracy. Trans. Elborg Forster and Larry Eugene Jones. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996. Print Preface, Page vii
[ii] Weitz, Eric D. Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007. Print.
[iii] Mommsen, Hans. The Rise & Fall of Weimar Democracy. Trans. Elborg Forster and Larry Eugene Jones. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996. Print Preface, Page vii
[iv] Hite, John, and Chris Hinton. Weimar & Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Murray, 2000. Print. SHP Advanced History Core Texts. Page 89
[v] Metzger, Rainer, and Christian Brandätter. Berlin: The Twenties. Trans. Claire Costa. New York: Abrams, 2007. Print. Page 371
[vi] Metzger, Rainer, and Christian Brandätter. Berlin: The Twenties. Trans. Claire Costa. New York: Abrams, 2007. Print. Page 382
[vii] Nicolson, Harold. "The Charm of Berlin." The Weimar Republic Sourcebook. Ed. Edward Dimendberg, Martin Jay, and Anton Kaes. Berkeley: University of California. 425-26. Print.
[viii] Roth, Joseph. What I Saw: Reports from Berlin 1920 - 1933. Trans. Michael Hofmann. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004. Print.
[ix] Kaes, Anton, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, eds. The Weimar Republic Sourcebook. London: University of California, 1995. Print. Page 425
[x] Gay, Peter. Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001. Print. Pages 77-78.
[xi] Hite, John, and Chris Hinton. Weimar & Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Murray, 2000. Print. SHP Advanced History Core Texts. Page89
[xii] Hite, John, and Chris Hinton. Weimar & Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Murray, 2000. Print. SHP Advanced History Core Texts. Page 89
[xiii] Mommsen, Hans. The Rise & Fall of Weimar Democracy. Trans. Elborg Forster and Larry Eugene Jones. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996. Print. Page 318
[xiv] Hite, John, and Chris Hinton. Weimar & Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Murray, 2000. Print. SHP Advanced History Core Texts. Page 50
[xv] Hite, John, and Chris Hinton. Weimar & Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Murray, 2000. Print. SHP Advanced History Core Texts. Page 86
[xvi] Layton, Geoff. Germany: The Third Reich 1933-45 for AQA. 3rd ed. London: Hodder Education, 2005. Print. Access to History. Page 4
[xvii] Hite, John, and Chris Hinton. Weimar & Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Murray, 2000. Print. SHP Advanced History Core Texts. Page 86
[xviii] Layton, Geoff. Germany: The Third Reich 1933-45 for AQA. 3rd ed. London: Hodder Education, 2005. Print. Access to History. Page 3
[xix] Layton, Geoff. Germany: The Third Reich 1933-45 for AQA. 3rd ed. London: Hodder Education, 2005. Print. Access to History. Page 4
[xx] Layton, Geoff. Germany: The Third Reich 1933-45 for AQA. 3rd ed. London: Hodder Education, 2005. Print. Access to History. Page 4
[xxi] Gay, Peter. Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001. Print. Page 8
[xxii] Those used in this investigation: Kaes, Anton, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg; Metzger, Rainer and Christian Brandätter; Mommsen, Hans; Roth, Joseph; Weitz, Eric D; Layton, Geoff.
[xxiii] Layton, Geoff. Germany: The Third Reich 1933-45 for AQA. 3rd ed. London: Hodder Education, 2005. Print. Access to History. Page 3
[xxiv] Weitz, Eric D. Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007. Print.Page 161
[xxv] Hite, John, and Chris Hinton. Weimar & Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Murray, 2000. Print. SHP Advanced History Core Texts. Page 86
[xxvi] Layton, Geoff. Germany: The Third Reich 1933-45 for AQA. 3rd ed. London: Hodder Education, 2005. Print. Access to History. Page 2
